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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Liens-Contractors and Materialnen-Married Women's Property-
Husband's Power to Charge
As a general rule there can be no contractor's or laborer's lien upon
property unless the materials had been furnished and work and labor
had been done under a contract with the owner, either'express or
implied.1 Since the lien is statutory,2 and since the statute provides
that the lien was "for the payment of debts contracted" for work
done or material furnished, the North Carolina courts have found it
easy to hold that no lien can be created unless there is a contract with
the owner.3
Applying this statute and the above rule, the court held in an early
case that a contractor could not get a lien on a married woman's prop-
erty for work done or material furnished under a contract with the
husband. The court suggested that the law should be otherwise, but
that it was not within the power of the court to change it. 4 Following
this decision and probably as a result of the court's suggestion, the
General Assembly in 1901 amended the lien law so as to give a con-
tractor a lien on a married woman's property when it appeared that a
building was built or repaired thereon with her consent or procurement,
and in such cases she was deemed to have contracted for such im-
provements.5 There is no doubt that the statute prevented fraud and
injustice upon laborers and materialmen. The husband could improve
the wife's property and he could enjoy it without any possibility of
losing the improvements if he did not pay for them. Before the enact-
ment of the statute, the wife's property could be greatly enhanced in
value and she could enjoy these benefits at the expense of the material-
man.
While this statute remained on the books, the Supreme Court
recognized in a number of cases that the lands of a married woman
' Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942) ; Boykin v. Logan,
203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932); Honeycutt v. Kenilworth Development
Co., 199 N. C. 373, 154 S. E. 628 (1930); Charlotte Foundry Co. v. Southern
Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90 S. E. 923 (1916) ; Weathers v. Cox, 159 N. C.
575, 76 S. E. 7 (1912) ; Weathers v. Borders, 124 N. C. 610, 32 S. E. 881 (1899);
Boone v. Chatfield, 118 N. C. 916, 24 S. E. 745 (1896).
'N .C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1943). See also Honeycutt v. Kenilworth Develop-
ment Co., 199 N. C. 373, 154 S. E. 628 (1930).
'Honeycutt v. Kenilworth Development Co., 199 N. C. 373, 154 S. E. 628(1930); N. C. Lumber Co. v. Spear Motor Co., 192 N. C. 377, 135 S. E. 115
(1926); Rose v. Davis, 188 N. C. 355, 124 S. E. 576 (1924); Nicholson v.
Nichols, 115 N. C. 200, 20 S. E. 294 (1894).
'Weir v. Page, 109 N. C. 220, 13 S. E. 773 (1891).
This section [N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1] shall apply to the property of a mar-
ried woman when it shall appear that such building was built or repaired on her
land with her consent or procurement, and in such cases she shall be deemed to
have contracted for such improvements. N. C. CoDE ANlx. (Michie, 1939)
§2434.
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who knew that her husband was making improvements thereon might
be subjected to a laborer's or materialman's lien when the circumstances
surrounding the transaction indicated that she consented to or procured
the work to.be done.6 But, in 1943 when the General Statutes were
enacted, this amendment to the lien law which made the property of a
married woman subject to a lien was dropped as being obsolete in
view of the subsequent enactment of the Martin Act, 7 which gave the
married woman full power to contract ;8 but there seems to be no logi-
cal reason why the Martin Act made the amendment of 1901 obsolete.
It must be remembered that the amendment to the lien law was enacted
at a time when married women were under many legal disabilities and
their power to contract was limited in that she could make no contract
to affect her real estate without the consent of her husband., The
amendment made the married woman's property subject to a lien as if
she had contracted in order to satisfy the requirement that there must
be a debt from the owner of the property before there can be a lien.10
This covers the situation where the woman did not contract for the
improvements but some one else did for her. This seems to be entirely
different from the provision in the Martin Act which gives the mar-
ried woman herself the power to contract for labor or materials and to
deal with her property as if she were unmarried. It must also be
remembered that in 1901 a married woman could contract and deal
with her real property-the only requirement being that she had to get
the consent of her husband ;" thus there seems to be no overlap with
the 1901 amendment. It is believed, therefore, that an error was made
by dropping the amendment to the lien statute and as a result uncer-
tainty as to the present law has arisen and some lienors have been
caught unaware of the change by this backhanded method of repeal.
' Rose v. Davis, 188 N. C. 355, 124 S. E. 576 (1924); Finch v. Cecil, 170
N. C. 72, 86 S. E. 992 (1915); Kearney v. Vann, 154 N. C. 311, 70 S. E. 747
(1911); Payne v. Flack, 152 N. C. 600, 68 S. E. 16 (1910); Finger v. Hunter,
130 N. C. 529, 41 S. E. 890 (1902).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1943). "N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2434-
Deleted as obsolete. The Martin Act, enacted in 1911 (N. C. CODE ANN. §2507)
enables a married woman 'to contract and deal so as to affect her real and personal
property in the same manner and with the same effect as if she were unmarried.'
In view of this, §2434 is now unnecessary." Explanatory Report of Committee on
Recodification.
'A married woman is authorized to contract and deal so as to affect her
real and personal property in the same manner and with the same effect as if she
were unmarried. N. C. Gai. STAT. §52-2 (1943).
' State v. Robinson, 143 N. C. 620, 56 S. E. 918 (1907); Ball v. Paquin, 140
N. C. 83, 52 S. E. 410 (1905) ; Finger v. Hunter, 130 N. C. 529, 41 S. E. 890
(1902); Weathers v. Borden, 124 N. C. 610, 32 S. E. 881 (1899); Pippen v.
Wesson, 74 N. C. 437 (1876).1 0Kearney v. Mann, 154 N. C. 311, 70 S. E. 747 (1911).
N . C. Laws 1871-2, c. 193, §17. See also Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. C. 437
(1876).
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At any rate, since the amendment of 1901 was dropped from the
1943 General Statutes, it appears that in regard to liens on her land
for labor and materials, she now stands on the same footing as any
other person. No other land owner has his land subjected to a lien for
labor or matdrials used unless he has contracted for them or has au-
thorized an agent to do so for him.12 In a recent case the court held
that "in order to create a lien in favor of a person who builds a house
on the land of another the circumstances must be such as to first create
the relationship of debtor and creditor."'13 Mere knowledge that work
is being done or material furnished does not enable a person furnishing
the labor or material to obtain a lien.' 4 Not even the land of a lessor is
subject to a lien for improvements made by the laborer or material-
man of the lessee when there is no evidence that the lessor contracted
to be obligated.' 5 In a recent case the court said that if the creditors
were unwilling to do the work and furnish the material upon the
credit of the debtor and intended to look to the security provided by
statute, ordinary prudence requires them to ascertain the status of the
title to the land upon which the building was to be erected and obtain the
approval or procurement of the owners.-' From these clearly estab-.
lished principles of lien law, and since the statute which provided that
a married woman was deemed to have contracted for the improvements
is no longer a part of our law, it seems that the separate estate of the
wife cannot be subjected to a lien for improvements placed thereon
by her husband unless she contracted with the husband constituting him
a sub-contractor or else made him her agent. If the present interpre-
tation of the lien statute is not extended it is difficult to see how a
laborer or materialman can get a lien on a married woman's property
when he contracted with the husband. Since the lien statutes are for
the primary protection of laborers and materialmen, in view of the
sound reasons for the enactment of the earlier statute, and to avoid
further confusion, it is suggested that the amendment of 1901 be
again made a part of our lien law.
PERRY C. HENSoN.
12Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942); Honeycutt v.
Kenilworth Development Co., 199 N. C. 373, 154, S. E. 628 (1930). See also
cases cited in note 1 and 2 supra.
" Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 246, 20 S. E. 2d 324, 326 (1942).
14 Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942).
" Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344. 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942) ; Critcher v. Wat-
son, 146 N. C. 150, 59 S. E. 544 (1907); Bailey v. Rutjes, 86 N. C. 517 (1882).
" Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942).
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